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Although the six-year drought in California has
recently been declared over, it is clear from
experiences there and other parts of the west (as
well as in the southeast) that current methods of
water allocation are deficient. In their paper on
water rights markets, Lynne and Saarinen discuss
the allocation of water by markets versus regulatory
approaches (whether court or bureaucratic). The
paper’s “I-we” emphasis ends in a call to blend the
two. Although I would have preferred the authors
provide more of a theoretical basis as to how water
markets do or do not work, this paper is a good first
attempt to establish their argument.
One popular strain in recent economic
literature is the primacy, if not perfection, of the
market system as the proper place for all resource
allocation decisions to take place. So called
“incentive based,” or “market cures” to every
societal ill are turning up with regularity,
particularly as a response to command and control
regulations affecting water quality. For example,
the Spring 1992 issue of the EPA Journal devotes
half the issue to “Trading for the Future: New
Approaches to Environmental Protection. ” While
Lynne and Saarinen avoid this trend, they
nonetheless also avoid a critical review of water
markets.
However, it is impossible to be even a
casual observer of the water situation in the west
and not recognize the failure of the current system.
Anderson and Leal call the water situation in the
west a by-product of the federal government’s water
pork barrel. While the Bureau of Reclamation, the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and other agencies
have spent much of the past 80 years trying to
“make the desert bloom like a rose,” tens of billions
of dollars have been spent on subsidized water to
western irrigators. As Wahl notes, with interest-free
loans and extended repayment schedules, irrigators
often pay less than ten percent of the cost to store
and deliver water. By the mid 1980s, irrigators
benefiting from the California Central Valley
Project had repaid only four percent of the capital
costs ---$38 million out of $950 million (Postel).
It is clear that ways to improve the
efficiency of water transfers are necessary. It is
clear not only in the U.S., but in other parts of the
world. Water auctions, for example, are being
tested in Australia (Simon and Anderson).
Although the current California drought is over,
with the 1985 opening of the Central Arizona
Project, water from the Colorado River to the
metropolitan water districts in southern California
was reduced by 500,000 acre-feet per year.
Anderson and Leal note that significant water
shortages are eminent unless some of the water
used to irrigate the San Joaquin Valley is transferred
to municipal uses. Cities in southern California pay
about $200 an acre-foot for water with an
expectation that the price will go to $500 an acre-
foot for any new storage and diversion facilities.
Water currently used by agriculture in the San
Joaquin Valley can be delivered by state and federal
water projects to farmers for as little as $5 per acre-
foot. Thus, as Anderson and Leal note, cities can
certainly afford to pay their current $200 an acre-
foot to purchase water from San Joaquin farmers.
The profits could be used to seek water
conservation technologies or install drip-sprinkler
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systems. The obstacle is that San Joaquin farmers
cannot sell water without federal consent. Obstacles
to water markets also occur for reasons other than
federal policy. An agreement was announced
recently allowing Nevada to temporarily lease
175,000 acre-feet per year of water from the
Colorado River from oil-shale developers in
Colorado. The agreement would have Nevada pay
$200 million to build an off-stream reservoir near
Grand Junction, Colorado and have water for 30 to
50 years at a price of $50 per acre-foot. The
agreement is meeting resistance from Colorado
officials who are trying to block such interstate
sales (IVaterweek).
Yet, some water transfers are being
accomplished. Postel shows that in 1991, 127 water
transactions of various kinds were reported in 12
western states, up from 121 in 1990, Near]y all the
water sold came from irrigation and about two-
thirds went to municipal uses. Half of the 1991
transfers occurred in Colorado where water sold for
$2,140 an acre-foot -- twice the 1989 average price.
Also, it was recently announced that the Clinton
Administration is trying to drastically reduce water
subsidies in the west. The plan would force farmers
to pay surcharges to irrigate more than nine million
acres,
However water markets are to work, water
rights must be clearly defined. The trendy view
advocating “letting the market work” is implicitly
saying something about property rights.
This brings me to what I believe is a
fundamental weakness with the analysis presented in
the Lynne and Saarinen paper. Their argument rests
on the observation that no government can
adequately account for all private and public
opportunity costs, nor can any market. Exactly ! So
the debate about water rights is not, as the authors’
emphasis suggests, about doing a better job of
blending the I and the We. The real debate about
water allocation is a debate about property rights.
The paper fails to start with what I believe to be the
basic question to be answered: Whose preferences
count? Once preferences are decided and property
rights secured, matters of market versus regulatory
action become clearer.
Once we decide whose preferences count,
we can tackle the current problem in water markets
--- the inability to transfer water rights. As noted in
the recent National Research Council Report, the
“Reclamation Era” has ended. We can no longer
rely on the federal government to build new
reservoirs to meet our growing water demands (see
also Tarlock). Water to meet new demands will
now have to come from reallocating existing
supplies. In the southeast, we see this in the current
“water wars” between Georgia, Florida, and
Alabama. This case began when Georgia asked the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to allow a
reallocation of water from Lake Lanier as well as
another 835 million gallons of water a day from the
Coosa and Chattahoochee River watersheds to meet
Atlanta’s drinking water needs,
In general, the primary source of
inefficiency y in water markets involves the
restrictions on water transfers, preventing water
from moving to its highest valued use (Tietenberg).
The existing mixed system of markets (whether
characterized by prior appropriation or riparian
doctrines) and regulators diminishes the degree of
transferability so that marginal net benefits are
rarely equalized. Even where regulation may work,
economists have criticized the substitution of
bureaucratically determined sets of priorities for
market priorities. These analysts claim that the
result is less likely to achieve an equalization of
marginal net benefits. So, they say, more market
solutions are needed. Again, what they are really
saying is that property rights should be changed to
reflect a different accounting of preferences. Water
for agricultural irrigation is being transferred to city
use. It is not clear that net benefits have increased.
What is clear is that preferences have changed. As
Schmid says, “one person’s right is another’s cost.”
Reliance on markets to produce efficiency
in water allocation also implies employing the most
efficient pricing mechanism where price is equated
to marginal costs. As Alfred Kahn showed, if we
rely on marginal cost pricing we must accept two
principles. First, the allocation of resources the
marginal cost pricing rule produces is accepted only
insofar as one approves the choice consumers make
or would make. Thus, Kahn says that one need
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place a similar evaluation on the distribution of
income. Kahn further notes two corollaries of
marginal cost pricing. First, price must reflect all
the marginal costs. As we know, externalities exist
in water use. Second, the marginal cost pricing rule
does not produce optimal results if applied only
partially. This “problem of the second best” will
certainly occur throughout the economy due to
imperfections of competition, monopoly power and
government policies that cause prices to diverge
from marginal costs.
Regarding water and water markets, a few
further comments are required. First, as Tietenberg
shows, rules, rights of use, and markets should
differ by the source of water. In fact, how we
define efficiency depends on the water source. The
problem with surface water absent storage is to
allocate a renewable supply among competing users.
Temporal effects are less important as future
supplies depend on natural phenomena rather than
on current withdrawal practices. On the other hand,
groundwater withdrawals do affect the resources
available in the future, So temporal allocation is
crucial. Further, whether surface or groundwater,
the resource moves freely across property and
cannot be seized except by reservoirs. Not only
does the quantity of water change from time to
time, but the physical nature of water makes the
definition and enforcement of rights difficult.
Second, in water markets we must be
cognizant of not just efficiency effects but equity or
distributional effects. The two of course are not
necessarily complementary, Unlike other goods, it
can be argued that efficiency effects should not
predominate, but must be subsumed under equity
effects. Schmalensee noted that economic efficiency
is an instrumental or derived objective, not a basic
social goal, While resource allocation should be
done efficiently, importance must be attached to
conflicting social goals. As Okin wrote, even
economists would sacrifice efficiency in the pursuit
of important basic social goals. A case can be
made that water availability may fall under this
category.
Third, to talk of using the market system to
more efficiently allocate water implies some form of
a competitive market framework. Yet Schmid said,
“The conventional focus on competition also has
ideological consequences, Some interests are not
served whether or not there is competition. Those
who gain from policies and rights unrelated to the
degree of competition are benefited when public
discourse ignores the wide-ranging sources of their
differential wealth and focuses on such questions as
whether or not to enforce antitrust laws or even
whether a particular product should be provided by
public or private firm, regulated or unregulated, or
whether welfare subsidies should be changed.”
Of course water delivery is not
characterized as a competitive system but more
often is a monopoly (and/or a monopsony), a
regulated monopoly, or at best an oligopoly. All
are inherently inefficient by definition. The
monopoly market is the one market model with the
potential for minimum economic efficiency and
substantial distortions of equity, Normally, we
characterized water delivery as a natural monopoly,
with a constantly declining long run average total
cost curve produced by superordinary economies of
scale. The economies of scale, along with an
inelastic demand for water that provides owners
with an opportunity to extract large rents and skew
income distribution in their favor, usually results in
public regulation. Even here, the notion of
preferences is important. “Economies of scale
create a human interdependence that is not
controlled simply by ownership of factors of
production. To advocate competition is not simply
to favor consumers over would-be monopolists but
to favor the interests of one group of consumers
over another. And, of course, public regulation
does the same thing” (Schmid).
Parenthetically, a fruitful area of research
would be to investigate the natural monopoly
characteristics of water supply. Are we sure water
can be characterized as a natural monopoly? There
are certainly large barriers to entry in the water
delivery industry, both in terms of capital
requirements and governmental permitting.
However, many small water systems exist. In
Georgia there are near]y 600 public systems and
2,200 licensed private water firms throughout the
state. While water delivery to an individual home
may also exhibit characteristics that suggest a need
to regulate a natural monopoly, the same was said
for telephone service until technology changed.
Also, Boyer has shown that for multiple product
producers, the standard definition of a natural
monopoly does not apply. Water suppliers do notJ. A~r. and Applied Econ., July, 1993
necessarily sell a homogeneous product at a single
price. Irrigation water is different from drinking
water, With water reuse and recycling becoming
common throughout the country it may be time to
revisit the natural monopoly definition of water
delivery.
Similarly, water markets do not resemble
other markets. As already noted, there has been a
long tradition of subsidized water that has greatly
distorted prices, particularly in the west. Wahl
discusses how one result of federal water subsidies
is that the low price of irrigation water in the west
does not reflect its true value. Additionally, water
distribution systems subsidized by property taxes (or
other general tax sources) are not unusual in the
east. Water is concentrated in large blocks in both
public and private hands. Further, water must
support a wide variety of public values (Tarlock).
While most work in the water economics literature
has focused on finding ways to make water transfers
more efficient, i.e. lowering transaction costs, often
neglected are the third party effects. Third parties
are seeking recognized interests in transfers which
of course will raise transaction costs and lower the
efficiency of markets.
Also, as Postel contends, efficiency aspects
of water apply not just to markets but to its use.
Not only must markets exist for buying and selling
water but we must also consider other functions that
water performs that are rarely valued in a market.
These include habitat protection, species
preservation, recreational use and aesthetics.
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Finally, water pricing, whatever the market
structure, is a great source of inefficiency. Rates
are almost always too low because of the use of
historic average costs rather than marginal costs
(Tietenberg). Further, marginal scarcity rent is
almost never considered. The price of water
delivered by municipal systems is derived from the
costs of production and distribution. Rarely is water
treated as a commodity with an associated price.
Also, most rate structures in the country still rely on
decreasing block rates that use cheap water as an
economic development tool. Results from the
American Water Works Association’s Water
Industry Data Base indicates that 40 percent of the
utilities surveyed nationwide use declining block
rates and 44 percent use a uniform rate.
Two last comments about the Lynne and
Saarinen paper, First, in a rhetorical question the
authors ask whether anyone has systematically
studied southern values and philosophies pertaining
to the water allocation process? This is a great
question and a great research area. The answer, I
believe, is no they have not.
Second, at another point in the paper, in
talking about ways to allocate water, the authors
note that “life is hard.” Well, so is hitting the curve
ball but we have people who can do that. So too do
we have people who can figure out water markets.
It is time for agricultural economists to be
concerned about water not just as an input to farm
production but as a resource that can benefit from
our analysis.
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